





# Vulnerability Management in Security By Design context

Project: Seamless Security-by-Design (SsbD)

## Nan Messe

with
Avi Shaked (University of Oxford)
Tom Melham (University of Oxford)






# Our Problem: DSbD Value Proposition






# Our Problem: DSbD Value Proposition





# The Vulnerability Problem



"... the fact that mitigating known software vulnerabilities is a complex systems problem and the current ecosystem does not sufficiently incentivize the investments required to secure the foundations of cyberspace."

"A **proactive** approach that focuses on eliminating entire classes of vulnerabilities reduces the potential attack surface and results in more reliable code, less downtime, and more predictable systems."




# Vulnerability Management?



GUIDANCE

### **Vulnerability management**

This area provides advice, guidance and other resources aimed specifically at those with an interest in vulnerability management.





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# Pages Vulnerability management Guidance — 1. Put in place a policy to update by default 2. Identify your assets 3. Carry out assessments by triaging and prioritising 4. The organisation

4. The organisation must own the risks of not updating

5. Verify and regularly review your vulnerability management process

Understanding vulnerabilities

### PAGE1 OF 8



All systems contain vulnerabilities. They may take the form of a configuration issue for system administrators to resolve, software defects requiring a vendor update, or even a vulnerability which the vendor doesn't yet know exists, for which a mitigation isn't available

This makes vulnerability management a critical control for organisations.

An effective vulnerability management process allows your organisation to understand, and validate on a regular basis, which vulnerabilities are present in your technical estate, where updates are failing, and to actively reduce the impact of both. It also allows you to react quickly when a critical vulnerability is disclosed, by helping you understand your organisation's exposure to it.

# **OVERVIEW: VULNERABLE BY DESIGN**



**Revision Date:** October 25, 2023

Technology is integrated into nearly every facet of daily life, as internet facing systems increasingly connect us to critical systems that directly impact our economic prosperity, livelihoods, and even health, ranging from personal identity management to medical care. One example of the disadvantage of such conveniences are the global cyber breaches resulting in hospitals canceling surgeries and diverting patient care. Insecure technology and vulnerabilities in critical systems may invite malicious cyber intrusions, leading to potential safety¹ risks.

As a result, it is crucial for software manufacturers to make secure by design and secure by default the focal points of product design and development processes. Some vendors have made great strides driving the industry forward in software assurance, while others continue to lag behind. The authoring organizations strongly encourage every technology manufacturer to build their products based on reducing the burden of cybersecurity on customers, including preventing them from having to constantly perform monitoring, routine updates, and damage control on their systems to mitigate cyber intrusions. We also urge the software manufacturers to build their products in a way that facilitates automation of configuration, monitoring, and routine updates. Manufacturers are encouraged to take ownership of improving the security outcomes of their customers. Historically, software manufacturers have relied on fixing vulnerabilities found after the customers have deployed the products, requiring the customers to apply those patches at their own expense. Only by incorporating secure by design practices will we break the vicious cycle of constantly creating and applying fixes. **Note:** The term "secure by design"

encompasses both secure by design and secure by default.

To accomplish this high standard of software security, the authoring organizations encourage manufacturers to prioritize the integration of product security as a critical prerequisite to features and speed to market. Over time, engineering teams will be able to establish a new steady-state rhythm where security is truly designed-in and takes less effort to maintain.

Reflecting this perspective, the European Union reinforces the importance of product security in the <u>Cyber Resilience Act</u>, emphasizing that manufacturers should implement security throughout a product's life-cycle in order to prevent manufacturers from introducing vulnerable products into the market.




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ASD AUSTRALIAN SIGNALS Federal Office for Information Set

Communications Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Centre canadien pour la cybersécurité

National Cyber Security Centre Ministry of Justice and Security

National Cyber Security Centre

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# Vulnerability Management By-Design

3. Vulnerability management. Some manufacturers have a vulnerability management program that focuses on patching vulnerabilities discovered internally or externally, and little more. More mature programs incorporate extensive datadriven analysis of vulnerabilities and their root causes, taking steps to systemically eliminate entire classes of vulnerability3. They implement formal programs around setting quality planning, quality control, quality improvement, and quality measurement. They view defect management as a business matter, not merely a security matter. These programs are not dissimilar in some ways to quality and safety programs in other industries.



Source: "Secure By Design - Shifting the balance of cybersecurity risk: principles and approaches for secure by design software", CISA et al., 2023.



# Vulnerability Management By-Design

# "Eliminating Vulnerabilities" series



CISA's Secure by Design Alert Series highlights the prevalence of widely known and documented vulnerabilities, with available and effective mitigations, that have not been eliminated. The Series urges technology manufacturers to build security into products from the beginning to eliminate classes of vulnerability, or product defects, that impact the safety of their customers.

Alerts are released in response to threat actor activity, but further demonstrate how secure by design software development can help reasonably protect against malicious cyber actors successfully exploiting predictable and well-known vulnerabilities.

MAY 02, 2024

Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities in Software

MAR 25, 202

Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating SQL Injection Vulnerabilities in Software

JAN 31, 2024

Secure by Design Alert: Security Design Improvements for SOHO Device Manufacturers

DEC 15, 2023


<u>Secure by Design Alert: How Manufacturers Can Protect Customers by Eliminating Default Passwords</u>

NOV 29, 2023

<u>Secure by Design Alert: How Software Manufacturers Can Shield Web Management Interfaces</u> <u>From Malicious Cyber Activity</u>

PR 13, 2023 ALERT

Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Security-by-Design and Default Principles





# Existing knowledge bases



Source: https://capec.mitre.org/about/new\_to\_capec.html



# Ontology to the rescue



■ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)

Memory Buffer Errors

Type ID

Nature

MemberOf





New to CWE?

Start here!

Home > CWE List > CWE- Individual Dictionary Definition (4.14) ID Lookup **CWE List** ▼ Mapping ▼ Top-N Lists ▼ Community ▼ About ▼ CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write Weakness ID: 787 **Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED** Abstraction: Base Mapping View customized information: Conceptual Operationa Complete Custom Friendly **▼** Description The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. ▼ Extended Description Typically, this can result in corruption of data, a crash, or code execution. The product may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent write operation then produces undefined or unexpected results. **▼ Alternate Terms Memory Corruption:** Often used to describe the consequences of writing to memory outside the bounds of a buffer, or to memory that is invalid, when the root cause is something other than a sequential copy of excessive data from a fixed starting location. This may include issues such as incorrect pointer arithmetic, accessing invalid pointers due to incomplete initialization or memory release, etc. **▼** Relationships ■ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000) Nature Type ID Name Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer ChildOf 119 Stack-based Buffer Overflow ParentOf 121 Hierarchy of Heap-based Buffer Overflow ParentOf 122 ParentOf Write-what-where Condition vulnerabilities ParentOf 124 Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow') CanFollow 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference ₿ 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset CanFollow CanFollow 824 Access of Uninitialized Pointer 825 **Expired Pointer Dereference** CanFollow



# Ontology to the rescue









About ▼ CWE List ▼ Mapping ▼ Top-N Lists ▼ Community ▼ Home

### CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

Weakness ID: 787 **Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED** Abstraction: Base

### **▼** Applicable Platforms

### Company of the com

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

### Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

### Demonstrative Examples

### **▼ Observed Examples**

ain: insufficient input validation ( <u>CWE-20</u> ) in browser allows heap corruption ( <u>CWE-787</u> ), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.  U kernel driver allows memory corruption because a user can obtain read/write access to read-only pages, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.  ain: integer truncation ( <u>CWE-197</u> ) causes small buffer allocation ( <u>CWE-131</u> ) leading to out-of-bounds write ( <u>CWE-787</u> ) in kernel pool, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.  t-of-bounds write in kernel-mode driver, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.  ape from browser sandbox using out-of-bounds write due to incorrect bounds check, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.  mory corruption in web browser scripting engine, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.  ain: mobile phone Bluetooth implementation does not include offset when calculating packet length ( <u>CWE-682</u> ), leading to out-of-bounds write ( <u>CWE-787</u> )
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sin: mobile phone Bluetooth implementation does not include offset when calculating packet length (CWF-682), leading to out-of-hounds write (CWF-787)
min. mobile prioric Biactock implementation account menace officer renearing packet length (CHE OCE), reading to out or boards write (CHE 707)
ain: compiler optimization ( <u>CWE-733</u> ) removes or modifies code used to detect integer overflow ( <u>CWE-190</u> ), allowing out-of-bounds write ( <u>CWE-787</u> ).
lformed inputs cause accesses of uninitialized or previously-deleted objects, leading to memory corruption
in: -1 value from a function call was intended to indicate an error, but is used as an array index instead.
checked length of SSLv2 challenge value leads to buffer underflow.
ffer underflow from a small size value with a large buffer (length parameter inconsistency, <u>CWE-130</u> )
ain: integer signedness error ( <u>CWE-195</u> ) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow ( <u>CWE-122</u> )
ssic stack-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
ap-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
1

Manifested by implementation vulnerabilities

### **Phase: Requirements**

### Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

### **Phase: Architecture and Design**

### Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-


Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings

Phases: Operation: Build and Compilation

Can be mitigated by controls




# Ontology to the rescue





# Conceptual Modelling to the rescue






# Example (1)

# Design situation: two components

```
C = \{\text{Linux\_instance}, \text{app\_instance}\}
T = \{\text{Linux\_OS}, \text{internal\_app}\}
V = \{\text{CWE-119}\}
S = \{\text{use\_memory\_safe\_languages}\}
R = \{\text{rule1}\}
```

# CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

```
\begin{array}{lll} VULNS(internal\_app) &= \{CWE-119\} & \\ \hline TYPES(Linux\_instance) &= \{Linux\_OS\} & \\ \hline TYPES(app\_instance) &= \{internal\_app\} & \\ \hline RVULNS(rule1) &= \{CWE-119\} & \\ \hline RTYPES(rule1) &= \{internal\_app\} & \\ \hline RCONTROLS(rule1) &= \{use\_memory\_safe\_languages\} & \\ \hline \end{array}
```





# Example (1)

Design situation: two components

```
C = \{ \text{Linux\_instance}, \text{app\_instance} \}
T = \{ \text{Linux\_OS}, \text{internal\_app} \}
V = \{ \text{CWE-119} \}
S = \{ \text{use\_memory\_safe\_languages} \}
R = \{ \text{rule1} \}
CWE-119: Improper Restriction Bounds of a Memory Buffer } Let's add a control
```

```
VULNS(internal_app) = {CWE-119}


TYPES(Linux_instance) = {Linux_OS}

TYPES(app_instance) = {internal_app}

RVULNS(rule1) = {CWE-119}
```

 $RTYPES(rule1) = \{internal\_app\}$ 

 $RCONTROLS(rule1) = \{use\_memory\_safe\_languages\}$ 






# Example (2)

# Design situation: two components

```
C = \{\text{Linux\_instance}, \text{app\_instance}\}\
T = \{\text{Linux\_OS}, \text{internal\_app}\}\
V = \{\text{CWE-119}\}\
S = \{\text{use\_memory\_safe\_languages}\}\
R = \{\text{rule1}\}\
```

# CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

```
VULNS(internal_app) = {CWE-119}
TYPES(Linux_instance) = {Linux_OS}
TYPES(app_instance) = {internal_app}
RVULNS(rule1)
RTYPES(rule1)
RCONTROLS(rule1)
Vulnerable
```





# Example (3)

Design situation: two components


```
C = \{\text{Linux instance, app\_instance}\}\
                                                T = \{\text{Linux OS, internal app}\}\
                                                Resource Set
 V = \{\text{CW} \setminus 119\}

√ (೨) Vulnerabilities
 S = \{ use \mid
               mory safe languages
                                                        10 Vulnerability CWE-119
                                                        Vulnerability CVE-2024-26589
              New
                                                    Component Types
                                                        Component Type Linux_operating_system
          vulnerability
CW
                                Dperations withi
                                                        Component Type internally_developed_application
Bound
           disclosure:
                                                Selection | Parent | List | Tree | Table | Tree with Columns
                                                                                                      Properties X
VULNS(internal app)
                           = \{CWE-119\}
                                                Property
                                                                                       Value
TYPES(Linux instance) = \{Linux OS\}
                                                 Affects
                                                                                       Component Type Linux_operating_system
                                                                                       (3) Vulnerability CWE-119
                                                 Manifests
TYPES(app instance)
                           = \{ internal app \}
                                                                                       ECVE-2024-26589
                                                 Name
RVULNS(rule1)
                           = \{CWE-119\}
                                                 Vulnerability Type
                                                                                       □CVE
RTYPES(rule1) = \{internal app\}
                           = \{ use memory safe languages \}
RCONTROLS(rule1)
```



# Example (3)

Design situation: two components






# Example (3)

Design situation: two com

```
C = \{\text{Linux\_instance, app\_instan} \ T = \{\text{Linux\_OS, internal\_app}\} \ V = \{\text{CWE\_110}\} \ S = \{\text{Cwe\_110}\} \ R = \{\text{rule1}\}
```


**CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations Bounds of a Memory Buffer** 



Resource Set	
<ul> <li>✓ Iplatform:/resource/VMFex1/vmfex1.trades</li> <li>✓ ♦ Analysis VMFex1</li> <li>✓ Isystem Scope</li> <li>Linux_instance</li> <li>organisational_application_instance</li> </ul>	
Selection Parent List Tree Table Tree with Columns	
■ Properties ×	
Property	Value
Assigned Controls	use_a_capability_based_addressing_hardware
Associated Controls	use_a_capability_based_addressing_hardware
Category	
Component Types	Component Type Linux_operating_system
CVA	🕖 Vulnerability CVE-2024-26589
CWA	
Name	□ Linux_instance
Rules	♦ Rule rule2, Rule rule3
Threat Allocations	
Unmitigated Vulnerabilities	
Unmitigated Weaknesses	
Vulnerable	<u>Iv</u> false



# Design is a sociotechnical system





# Summary

- Model-driven methodology for vulnerability management
- Automated reasoning mechanism
- Information-exchange interface
- Vulnerability management made:
  - **>** Systematic
  - **>**Scalable
  - **≻**Rigorous

Thank You nan.messe@irit.fr